Ethics Consent
This article is part of an Ethical theory.
All evil occurs when consent is given to desires which should not be, or withheld from those which should be. While the formation of good desires can be slowly encouraged, anyone can always choose of their own Free Will whether a desire will be consented to or repudiated, and thus which intentions are formed. This is the core of moral responsibility and thus consent is the primary location of a moral act.
Locating Morality
It is impossible to do evil without consenting to base desires. Vice is that by which we are made prone to sin; that is, to consent to what is not fitting, or the formation of evil intentions. However, being prone to sin is different from actually consenting to it. Also, intending to do evil is different from the action. We may be tempted by a vicious desire; we may even anticipate or consider the pleasures associated with that desire. However, until we agree to the desire, and form an active intention to implement the desire, no harm has been done; we are merely wrestling with our base nature. However, once we have consented to a desire, we would carry it out, if and when circumstances allow; thus only external circumstance, which can't be the cause of internal sin, distinguishes between the plotter and the criminal. Given evidence of an action, when judging a man's morality, we think not of what is done, but in why it is done - that is, the underlying intention; and the merit or glory of the doer lies in the intention, not the deed. The intention formed before the axe is swung is the difference between just execution, and cold-blooded murder - the physical act is essentially the same. Thus morality is found primarily in the formation of intentions, not in the presence of vices or virtues, their contemplation or anticipation, or even the physical acts of good or evil.
Consent
The formation of intentions, being central to morality, requires closer examination. Many desires, both good and bad, continually pass through our consciousness. Only a few are chosen to form intentions for action. These are selected through a combination of the power of the desire, the ease with which the desire may be fulfilled, and knowledge of the consequences of fulfilling the desire, including trade-offs of other desires unfulfilled. This is most readily seen when spending money. The impulsive select the first pleasant items they see, and are soon skint. The wiser look at a range of items, and then choose a combination of goods that serve them best. The austere comment sagely on all, and then choose not to spend their money, and so gain even less than the impulsive. We see that forming intentions is risky, but not forming them at all is pointless. The weighing of desires and consequences is performed by Prudence, or practical wisdom. This wisdom is formed, in part, by the consideration of relevant knowledge. However, the most knowledgeable sage can be the least practical or aware of consequences - the practical application of the knowledge is where true wisdom lies.
Consent and Knowledge
The more knowledge one has, the more likely one can predict the more likely consequences of a course of action. The areas of prediction includes the opinions and responses of others, the rules of the physical world, the lessons of history, political and economic considerations, and the risks of unexpected events impinging on the plan. The prediction is not a science like Astrology, but more a weighing of the various consequences, given the propensity of each to occur, and the effects each may engender. While no exact prediction is possible, the aim is to evaluate the average effect of a planned course of action, and the risk of it going truly wrong. Accidents or unlikely events may occur, and an intention can still be Prudent even if events turn out in an unforeseen manner, as long as they were not preventable or missed through careless planning.
Consent Analogies
Analogy: Adultery
Suppose a man lusts after another man's wife, but restrains himself, and encourages himself to think lustfully of his own wife instead. He has done no wrong. And allow that he is somehow tricked, and lies with this other woman while believing that she is his wife. He has done no wrong. Suppose though, that he had doubts of his bed-partner's identity, but refused to light a candle to check, and instead chose to enjoy the moment at hand. Then he has done wrong, for he has cast his mind from the facts at hand and formed an intention to sleep with this woman whomever she may be. Compare this with mortal justice, where if a man sleeps with another's wife and then claims he mistook her for his own, he is punished for adultery and deceit, unless the women are sisters or otherwise similar in countenance - it is more likely that he lies than is himself deceived.
Analogy: Murder
Suppose a man desires to murder his neighbour. If he decides not to kill, he has not consented to vice, and has resisted evil - to be good he would need to actively engage in a relevant virtue - perhaps charity towards or forgiveness of his neighbour. Having desired to kill and consented to his vice, he now intends evil - whether he successfully kills or not only determines the weight of the evil. If he fails to kill, he is merely evil and incompetent, and thus bears a lesser evil.
Analogy: The Evils of Drink.
If, while desiring excess drink, an alcoholic decides not to drink, he has not consented to vice, and has resisted evil. Contrast this with a non-alcoholic, who does not feel the instinctual desire to drink to excess and thus does not; he is merely not bad. An alcoholic, having desired excess drink, consented to his vice, and then been unable to find sufficient drink to satisfy his desire, is merely well-behaved, but has still sinned, incompletely and incompetently.
Redirected Consent
It is possible to do evil by consent without direct desire for that evil. This may happen via coercion, where someone else provides the desire, which we discuss under Shared Responsibility. It can also occur through redirected desire. This redirected desire highlights an essential difference between desire and consent - redirected desire is still the desire for the original aim, but redirected consent is consent for the intermediate aim. This is best shown by an example.
Self Defence
Suppose a man is attacked by a stranger with the means and intent to kill. Fleeing is not an option, and self-preservation appears to demand that the aggressor is killed. The defender claims he has neither a desire to kill nor consents to kill his attacker. He then kills his attacker "against his own will". However, he has a desire to live, and has consented to live. He thus has a desire to kill in order to live, and has also consented to kill in order to live. Now, qualified desire for something is not true desire. Observe that if I say to a robber "Take my money, but spare my children", I do not concede that I want my money to be taken. However, qualified consent is true consent. If I consent to "Take my money, but spare my children", I have consented that you may take my money (assuming that my children are spared). Thus, if the defender desires to kill in order to live, he only desires to live, but if he consents to kill in order to live, he consents to kill. His consent has been redirected.
Self Defence and the Aggressor's Intent
When in a circumstance where every choice satisfies a vice, the moral agent has a true dilemma. In the case of being attacked, the defender's dilemma is whether to strike back and so consent to the sin of killing, or to allow the aggressor to take his life and thus jointly consent to the same sin. The decision here is not simple, being based on several delicate and subjective judgements as well as occurring in a heated situation, where intellectual activity is not best performed. Assuming that the aggressor has freely consented to kill, whether from their own vicious desire or someone else's desire via coercion, then the vicious desire adds more weight of evil to the wrongful consent than the virtuous desire of the defender. However, if the aggressor is also acting from a sense of self-preservation, then the defender's intent to kill carries as much weight of evil as the aggressor. This is a true moral tragedy - neither man desires to kill, but both have consented to it, and one must sin, while the other dies. In such situations, any act of consent will result in evil. One must minimise the weight of evil, and request forgiveness via divine grace for that which has occurred.
Politeness
Politeness, or being well behaved, is merely redirecting consent out of the fear of social opprobrium when otherwise a desire would have been acted on. If the initial consent was bad, the sin has already occurred, even if social restraints prevent its occurrence in the same way that guards prevent assassinations by their mere presence. Being well-behaved is not a moral choice; it merely demonstrates the fear of social rejection outweighed the desire for the actions consented to. Note that politeness can also prevent good acts from occurring, or encourage participation in evil acts. Politeness as such is thus morally neutral, although it is a means of keeping social order and of habituating people to consider the effect on others when forming consent. Most instances of politeness also encourage moderation, and virtue over vice, thus forming good habits.
Politeness as Collective Redirection
Politeness can be seen as an act of redirected consent imposed by the corporate entity of society. Each society has habituated itself to resist temptation of those traits it frowns upon (individual honesty can be seen as a temptation in a corrupt society, or freedom in a slaving society). It then consents to its current habits, and imposes its will on members who would have otherwise consented to a different intention. This area is covered in greater depth under Immoral Orders.
